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This study uses unique division-level data of Japanese firms to examine how foreign direct 
investment (FDI) affects domestic employment. Contrary to most previous studies focusing on 
the effect on net employment growth, we decompose it into gross job creation and gross job 
destruction. We find that FDI destination plays an important role: FDI to Asia increases job 
creation, while FDI to Europe or North America decreases it. A frictional search-and-matching 
model with heterogeneous jobs can explain the differential effects. The model provides 
additional predictions on job creation and destruction by job type, which are also empirically 
confirmed.  
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I.  Introduction 
Along with the rapid globalization since the late nineties, multinational firms have increased 
their influence on the domestic labor market. In the period between 1990 and 2015, world 
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows increased 9.4-fold or 2.8 times faster than world gross 
domestic product (GDP) and 1.9 times faster than world trade.1 This trend evoked a skeptic 
view in developed countries that domestic jobs would be offshored to low-wage developing 
countries. Whether outward FDI contributes to home employment has drawn much academic 
and policy interest. The empirical literature thus far has provided mixed evidence, depending 
on the sample countries and performance measures of foreign activities. Due to data limitations, 
most of the studies focus on the effect of FDI on net employment growth, which is the difference 
between gross job creation (total employment gains in expanding establishments) and gross job 
destruction (total employment losses in contracting establishments). 
Even on finding a positive effect of FDI on net employment growth, one should be 
cautious in concluding that FDI is always good for home employment. Net employment growth 
can be positive in both cases: (i) where gross job creation increases and gross job destruction is 
unchanged and (ii) where job creation is unchanged and gross job destruction decreases. The 
two cases illustrate very different labor markets: case (i) shows an active labor market favoring 
job seekers, while case (ii) shows a stable one rewarding existing employees. For a country 
benefitting from globalization, case (i) would be more preferable than case (ii), because welfare 
gains are obtained through the reallocation of factors between sectors and firms to their most 
productive uses (Melitz, 2003; Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2013; Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2017). 
This study examines the impact of outward FDI on job creation and job destruction 
using unique Japanese firm-establishment-division level panel data from 1996 to 2016. 
Contrary to most existing studies, we construct a measure of job creation and destruction within 
 
1 The data are from the World Bank Development Indicators: https://databank.worldbank.org/home.aspx. 
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an establishment by exploiting information on division level employment. Specifically, we 
count the number of newly added jobs for all divisions within a firm with multiple 
establishments and use it to define the job creation of the firm. Similarly, we define the job 
destruction of a firm as the number of newly eliminated jobs for all divisions within the firm. 
This definition helps interpret our empirical results by elucidating firm-decision-making based 
on which we build a frictional search-and-matching model with heterogeneous jobs. The theory 
highlights the roles of different jobs (or divisions), and its mechanism is further confirmed 
empirically. 
We also pay special attention to the destinations of FDI, which are strongly associated 
with the purpose of the FDI. Multinationals tend to invest in developing countries in Asia to 
seek low-price factors, which is known as vertical FDI. Contrastingly, those investing in Europe 
and/or North America tend to be motivated by gaining better access to the local market, known 
as horizontal FDI.2 Apart from the availability of unique data, the case of Japan is particularly 
worth investigating because the destination of Japanese FDI is geographically dispersed. 
Japan’s FDI into Europe and North America and Asia accounted for 65% and 25% in 2015, 
respectively, both concerning the value of outward FDI and the number of affiliates.3 In this 
way, Japanese FDI provides an ideal example to compare the various impacts of vertical and 
horizontal FDI on the labor market of developed countries. 
 We specifically examine the effect of FDI into Asia and Europe/North America, 
measured by the log number of foreign affiliates, on their domestic job creation and destruction. 
Our identification strategy uses industry-mean FDI as an instrument for firm-level FDI.4 There 
 
2 See Markusen (2004, Ch. 8) on theoretical accounts for vertical and horizontal FDI. 
3 The data on FDI values are from JETRO (in Japanese): 
https://www.jetro.go.jp/world/japan/stats/fdi.html. The data on the number of affiliates, which corresponds 
to “Number of enterprises,” are from OECD Statistics: https://stats.oecd.org. 
4 Our strategy is partly inspired by studies on intergenerational persistence of economic status (Shea, 2000) 




are two reasons why we believe this is a plausible instrument. First, industry-mean FDI is an 
aggregate measure that is correlated with FDI by individual firms but is beyond individual 
influences. Second, part of the variation in industry-mean FDI is attributed to industry 
characteristics rather than firm characteristics. For example, some industries such as chemical 
and machinery are by nature easier to fragment their production processes into finer stages and 
offshore processes than other industries (Hummels et al., 2001 suggestive evidence). Another 
example to indicate industry-specific attributes is that factor costs within and across countries 
differ widely by industry (Du Caju et al., 2010). Du Caju et al. (2010) conclude that 
interindustry wage differentials in eight European countries could reflect the difference in labor 
market institutions. We further address potential concerns about the self-selection of firms into 
particular industries by controlling for measures of firm characteristics such as revenue, 
productivity, research and development (R&D), and capital-labor ratio.  
The results indicate that investments in Asia and Europe/North America have a positive 
effect on net employment growth in Japan. The effect on gross employment changes, that is, 
job creation and destruction, may differ by destination. Investment in Asia has a positive effect 
on domestic job creation, whereas investment in European/North American countries has a 
negative effect. Regarding job destruction, the impact is negative regardless of the FDI 
destination.  
We then construct Wasmer’s (1999) based frictional job-search-and-matching model 
to illustrate the mechanism by which FDI can affect domestic job creation and destruction 
differently in different destinations.5 In the model, there are two types of jobs: high-skilled and 
 
income raises happiness, Pischke (2011) and Li et al. (2014) use industry-average wage as an instrument for 
family/individual income. In this context, Pischke and Schwandt (2012) give a cautionary note on the 
industry-level instrument. Applications in the context of international trade can be found in, e.g., Hoekstra 
(2013). 
5 While the flow of jobs created must be equal to that of jobs destroyed in the steady state where all 
adjustments are done, these may differ in the short run where state variables such as capital and 
(un)employment rate do not change. 
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low-skilled. Firms face a trade-off between paying high search costs and enjoying a stable 
match with high-skilled workers, or paying low search costs but having an unstable match with 
low-skilled workers. An exogenous increase in the FDI of a firm requires more support from 
home, thereby making the match of both job types more stable. This setting is motivated by the 
fact that outward FDI by Japanese multinationals in automobile industry is complementary to 
exports of intermediate parts from Japan (Nishitateno, 2013). It can explain the empirical result 
of why FDI, regardless of its destination, accounts for lower job destruction. 
The effect of FDI in different regions on the duration of domestic job match is assumed 
to vary, given the fact that the purpose of FDI by Japanese multinationals differs regionally. 
Japanese multinationals investing in Asia tend to export intermediate goods from home to 
affiliates for low-cost assembly (Fukao et al., 2003; Fujita and Hamaguchi, 2012).6 Thus, FDI 
to Asia is thought to be complementary to low-skilled domestic workers engaged in production 
and related services, creating more low-skilled jobs and fewer high-skilled jobs. Due to its low 
hiring cost, the increase in low-skilled job creation raises the overall job creation despite the 
decline in high-skilled job creation. 
Contrastingly, Japanese multinationals investing in Europe/North America tend to 
substitute exports from home for local production and services to save transportation costs. FDI 
to Europe/North America is thought to be substitutable to domestic low-skilled workers, making 
firms create fewer low-skilled jobs and more high-skilled jobs. Because of the high hiring cost, 
the magnitude of increase in high-skilled job creation is not as high as that of the decrease in 
low-skilled jobs. Thus, overall job creation declines. We further test this theoretical mechanism 
by dividing divisions into high-skilled and low-skilled ones and measuring job creation and 
 
6 According to Nishitateno (2013), outward FDI in automobile industry shows a stronger complementarity 
to exports from Japan to Asia than exports from Japan to other regions. Fukao et al. (2003) find that trade in 
similar but quality-differentiated products (i.e., vertical intra-industry trade), which is likely to be driven by 
factor-cost differences, are more prominent in Asia than in Europe. 
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destruction of each division. 
 
Relation to the literature 
There is a wide body of literature on the impact of outward FDI on the home labor market using 
firm/establishment-level data. Existing studies find mixed evidence (Brainard and Riker, 1997; 
Desai et al., 2009; Muendler and Becker, 2010; Kovak et al., 2018).7 Using data on United 
States (US) multinationals, Desai et al. (2009) and Kovak et al. (2018) find a positive effect of 
affiliate employment on parent employment. Contrastingly, Muendler and Becker (2010) use 
data on German multinationals to estimate the labor demand system and find negative 
elasticities of home employment with respect to foreign wage.  
These mixed findings have motivated subsequent studies to take a deeper look at the 
destinations of FDI (Debaere et al., 2010; Navaretti et al., 2010; Harrison and McMillan, 2011; 
Hijzen et al., 2011). By dividing the destinations of US multinationals into high- and low-
income countries, Harrison and McMillan (2011) find that affiliate employees in low-come 
countries are substitutable for parent employees in the US. Debaere et al. (2010) echo their 
results using data on South Korean multinationals: starting operation in less-advanced countries 
decreases parent employment growth. Hijzen et al. (2011) contrastingly find that FDI in low-
income (or high-income) countries has no significant (or positive) effect for French 
multinationals. These studies measure the labor variation by applying the level or growth rate 
of employment of parent firms. 
We take one step further, and decompose net employment growth into gross job 
creation and destruction by utilizing unique firm-establishment-division level data. We follow 
 
7 See Hummels et al. (2018) for comprehensive surveys. There is another growing literature on the impact 
of import competition on domestic labor market, starting from Autor et al. (2013). Subsequent studies focus 
on the role of service sector (Feentsra and Sasahara, 2018), export exposure (Feenstra et al., 2019), worker 




the approach of Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) to calculate job creation and job destruction. Our 
approach differs from theirs in that the calculations of job creation/destruction are conducted at 
the division level rather than at the establishment level, which allows us to take advantage of 
the detailed information on labor variation for each division within firms. Job creation and 
destruction constructed from division-level data also motivated us to build a simple frictional 
search-and-matching theory with heterogeneous jobs, whose implications are further verified 
by additional empirical tests. There are a few exceptional studies examining the relationship 
between job creation and destruction of parent firms and establishments (Moser et al., 2010; 
Boehm et al., 2020). However, their focus is not on the differential impact of FDI on different 
destinations, which is of primary interest.  
When it comes to the studies using data on Japanese multinationals, Hijzen et al. (2007) 
and Yamashita and Fukao (2010) find that outward FDI has a positive effect on net employment 
growth and firm performance.8 The closest study to ours is Hayakawa et al. (2013), examining 
the role of FDI destinations.9 More specifically, they find that starting operations both in low-
income countries (vertical FDI) and high-income countries (horizontal FDI) has a positive 
effect on net employment. We echo their findings in that an increase in the number of affiliates 
in both Asia (vertical FDI) and Europe/North America (horizontal FDI) has a positive effect on 
net employment growth. We further advance their findings by taking a closer look at gross job 
flows, which can be decomposed into job creation and destruction. Although there are a few 
studies measuring job creation and destruction using data on Japanese multinationals (Ando 
and Kimura, 2015; Kodama and Inui, 2015), they focused on aggregated job flows such as 
industry-level or sector-level job creation and destruction based on firm-establishment level 
 
8 Other studies examining the impact of FDI by Japanese multinationals on domestic labor market focus on 
the entry and exit of establishments (Ito and Ikeuchi, 2017) and non-regular workers (Tanaka, 2017). 
9 Kambayashi and Kiyota (2015) also highlight the role of FDI destinations. However, their main focus is 
on the prices of final and investment goods in destination countries, rather than the direct impact of FDI.  
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data rather than firm-establishment-division level data. Furthermore, econometric analysis of 
job creation and destruction were not provided in those studies.  
Apart from empirical practice, our simple theory to explain the differential effects of 
FDI on job creation and destruction also contributes to the theoretical literature on the large-
firm version of the frictional search-and-matching model (Pissarides, 2000, Ch. 3; Wasmer, 
1999; Cahuc and Wasmer, 2001).10 Contrary to the standard matching model, where there is a 
one-to-one match between workers and jobs/firms, the large-firm setting allows one firm to 
match with multiple workers and is, thus, more suitable for interpreting reduced-form empirical 
results than the standard setting. Wasmer (1999) extends it to incorporate two types of 
heterogeneous jobs: one with high hiring cost and low job-separation rate, and the other with 
low hiring cost and high job-separation rate. He examines the effect of the growth of labor 
productivity on job composition in a steady state. We simplify his framework and conduct 
different comparative statics: how changes in job-separation rate, which is assumed to be caused 
by FDI, affect job creation and destruction of each type of job in the short run, where state 
variables remain unchanged. Although our framework is similar to that of Wasmer (1999), the 
full analytical characterization of comparative statics reveals the exact relationship between the 
aggregate job creation and the job creation of each job type. We believe the results obtained in 
this study would be a useful benchmark when sorting out the empirical results of FDI’s impact 
on domestic job creation and destruction.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section introduces the 
data and estimation strategy. Section 3 presents the empirical results. To propose a possible 
mechanism behind the results, Section 4 builds a frictional search-and-matching model. The 
model provides additional testable implications, which are empirically confirmed. The final 
 
10  Subsequent studies using the large-firm setting (multi-worker firm setting in general) examine the 
generalization of intra-firm bargaining (Cahuc et al., 2008; Acemoglu and Hawkins, 2014), business cycle 
(Mandelman and Zanetti, 2014; Dossche et al, 2019; Kudoh et al., 2019), and many other issues. 
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section concludes the study.  
 
 
II.  Data and methodology 
Data, job creation, and job destruction 
This study uses firm-level data collected through the Basic Survey of Japanese Business 
Structure and Activities (BSJBSA), which is conducted annually by the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade, and Industry, Japan. The survey covers almost all medium and large firms in Japan; small 
firms who employ ≥ 50 workers with ≥ 30,000,000 yen worth of capital are also included. The 
response rate is over 80%, with around 30,000 firms completing the questionnaire each year. 
The samples of manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms were used for this study, covering 
the years 1995–2017. Summary statistics of the data are reported in Table A1 of Appendix 1. 
We removed outliers that recorded negative value terms such as R&D, revenue, or export.  
The approach for calculating job creation and destruction is similar to that used by 
Davis and Haltiwanger (1999); the difference is that our calculations occur at the division level 
and, thus, capture the job creation and destruction within the firm. Job creation in a firm is 
defined as the sum of all new jobs in the firm’s expanding and newly opened divisions, while 
job destruction in a firm is defined as the sum of all eliminated jobs in the firm’s downsizing or 
closed divisions. Furthermore, the firm’s branches or plants are considered to be similar to 
divisions. Newly set up and closed firms are excluded; they are not within the scope of this 
study’s objectives because such job creation/destruction instances are quite different from those 
in existing firms. 
First, the magnitude of job creation in firm i in year t is defined as the sum of all new 
jobs in expanding divisions in firm i in year t, represented as follows (the number of divisions 
in firm i is d): 
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𝐽𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ ∆𝑁𝑖,𝑑,𝑡𝐶𝑆𝑑=1  
where  ∆𝑁𝑖,𝑑,𝑡𝐶 = 𝑁𝑖,𝑑,𝑡 − 𝑁𝑖,𝑑,𝑡−1 
conditioned on 𝑁𝑖,𝑑,𝑡 − 𝑁𝑖,𝑑,𝑡−1 > 0. 
 
In the above equations, S is the number of divisions in firm i, and 𝑁𝑖,𝑑,𝑡 is the number of 
workers employed in division d in firm i in year t. 
The magnitude of job destruction in firm i in year t is defined as the sum of all 
diminished jobs in diminishing divisions in firm i in year t, represented as follows (the number 
of divisions in firm i is d): 
𝐽𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ ∆𝑁𝑖,𝑑,𝑡𝐷𝑆𝑑=1  
where  ∆𝑁𝑖,𝑑,𝑡𝐷 = −(𝑁𝑖,𝑑,𝑡 − 𝑁𝑖,𝑑,𝑡−1) 
conditioned on 𝑁𝑖,𝑑,𝑡 − 𝑁𝑖,𝑑,𝑡−1 < 0. 
 
In practice, we use JC and JD as our main dependent variables. Furthermore, to make the 
analysis comparable to the previous literature, we also calculate the within-firm net 
employment and investigate how the Japanese multinational firms’ overseas investments will 





Our baseline regression of job creation takes the following form: 
 𝐽𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾1𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎_𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐸𝑈_𝑁𝐴_𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (1)  
 𝐽𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿1𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎_𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐸𝑈_𝑁𝐴_𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
 
The regressions for job destruction and net employment, that is, job creation minus job 
destruction, are analogously defined. 𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎_𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒  is the log of the number of Asian 
affiliates of firm i in year t, and 𝐸𝑈_𝑁𝐴_𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 is the log of the combined number of 
affiliates that are located in Europe or North America for firm i in year t. Controls is the vector 
of control variables including the capital-labor ratio, R&D expenditure share concerning 
revenue, foreign capital share, firm age, revenue (log), and total factor productivity.11 Firm and 
year fixed effects are also included. 
Because both FDI decisions and domestic employment decisions are made by the same 
firm, our estimation may be subject to endogeneity bias. One might consider that firms actively 
engaged in foreign investment need to make adjustments to within-firm employment more 
frequently because these firms are more sensitive to cost variation and labor reallocation is an 
efficient way to alleviate cost shocks. If this is the case, our baseline estimation may suffer from 
self-selection biases. To mitigate this problem, we apply a two-stage instrumental variable (IV) 
method. An ideal instrument is the one that is closely related to firms’ FDI decision but does 
not affect the employment dynamics within firms. Thus, the instrument we can think of 
naturally is the industry-level FDI trend. In practice, we use the (log) average number of Asian 
affiliates and European/North American affiliates in industry j in year t, and 
 
11 In the baseline specification, we use the method as in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). For robustness checks, 
we apply Olley and Pakes (1996), and stochastic frontier methods as well.  
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mean_Asia_affiliatejt and mean_EU_NA_affiliatejt as an instrument for Asia_affiliateit and 
EU_NA_affiliateit, respectively. The fitted value obtained in the first stage will be used in the 
second stage to measure the elasticity of within-firm employment regarding FDI.  
The industry-mean FDI is correlated with but is not directly affected by individual firm 
FDI as long as the industry is sufficiently large. Besides, at least part of the variation in industry-
mean FDI comes from industry characteristics rather than from firm characteristics; thus, the 
instrument is plausibly exogenous to firm-decision making on domestic employment. There are 
two arguments why we think this is the case. First, how easily firms expand foreign activities 
crucially depends on the nature of the products and services of their industry. Some industries 
are more amenable to the spatial separation of production processes and, thus, tend to establish 
more foreign affiliates than other industries (Baldwin, 2016). Suggestive evidence for the 
industry variation of the easiness of the so-called unbundling reported that the use of imported 
intermediates in producing goods exported, which they call vertical specialization, varies 
widely across industries within a country in 10 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries and four emerging economies (Hummels et al., 2001; Johnson 
and Noguera, 2012).12 Second, inter-industry factor costs, particularly wages, vary widely 
across countries, mainly due to differences in institutions (Du Caju et al., 2008; 2010). Du Caju 
et al. (2010) observed huge inter-industry wage differential across eight member countries in 
the European Union (EU) and attributed this to the difference in rent-sharing rule determined 





12 A concept related to vertical specialization is vertical intra-industry trade (Fontagne and Freudenberg, 
2002 for a survey). 
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III.  Estimation results 
Table 1 demonstrates the baseline estimation results, as in Eqs. (1) and (2): This shows that FDI 
to Asian countries has a positive effect on domestic job creation, but the effect is negative for 
FDI to European/North American countries. As indicated in columns (3) and (4), FDI to Asian 
countries prevents firms from removing the jobs, and so does the investment in Europe/North 
American countries. When we combine these two effects, as presented in columns (5) and (6), 
FDI to Asia has an overall positive impact on the net employment of Japanese firms, which is 
easy to follow because the job creation effect is much larger. In the meantime, FDI to 
Europe/North America is also associated with net employment growth. If we compare the 
magnitude of the coefficient of EU_NA_affiliate between the case of JC and JD, it can be 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
variable 
JC JC JD JD Net Net 
Asia_affiliate 20.68*** 17.24*** -1.204 -1.256 29.27*** 25.80*** 
 (3.627) (3.633) (3.712) (3.719) (3.653) (3.662) 
EU_NA_affiliate -8.457* -10.44** -41.34*** -41.55*** 50.14*** 48.46*** 
 (4.568) (4.570) (4.674) (4.678) (4.532) (4.536) 
Capital_labor_ratio -50.71*** -46.48*** 9.713*** 11.59*** -68.94*** -66.80*** 
 (2.809) (2.856) (2.874) (2.924) (2.903) (2.954) 
R&D share -8.842 6.761 9.776 7.041 -22.95 1.454 
 (18.72) (18.69) (19.16) (19.13) (20.58) (20.55) 
Foreign_capital_share -0.0899*** -0.0904*** -0.0976*** -0.0985*** -0.0439* -0.0413 
 (0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0257) (0.0257) 
Firm_age -0.00673 -0.00665 -0.00309 -0.00321 -0.00333 -0.00277 
 (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0223) (0.0223) 
TFP_LP -2.843  25.15***  -37.98***  
 (4.431)  (4.534)  (4.566)  
14 
 
ln_Revenue  29.94***  19.25***  5.855 
  (3.905)  (3.997)  (4.036) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 151,727 151,727 151,727 151,727 128,763 128,763 
R-squared 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.009 
Number of firms 23,368 23,368 23,368 23,368 20,579 20,579 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 
10%. 
Notes: “Net” in columns (5) and (6) is defined as the difference between JC and JD. 
 
As for the instrumental variable estimation, to test the credibility of the instruments, 
we calculated the correlation between IVs and major variables of interest. As can be seen from 
Table 2, mean_Asia_affiliate and mean_EU_NA_affiliate have almost no correlation with the 
dependent variables, whereas the correlation with the instrumented variables is relatively high. 
The first-stage results are presented in Table 3-A. mean_Asia_affiliate is shown to 
positively affect Asia_affiliate and EU_NA_affiliate, but the same does not apply to 
mean_EU_NA_affiliate. When it comes to the second-stage estimation, as indicated in Table 3-
B, Asia_affiliate has a positive effect on job creation, and the effect is negative for 
EU_NA_affiliate. As indicated in columns (3) and (4), both the investment in Asian and 
European/North American countries negatively affects JD. If we combine these two effects 
(impact on JC and JD) because the magnitude of JC is larger than that on JD, for both 
Asia_affiliate and EU_NA_affiliate, we should expect their impact on the net employment to 






Correlation between the IVs and variables of interest 
  JC JD Net 
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mean_Asia_affiliate -0.0107 -0.0093 -0.0026 
mean_EU_NA_affiliate -0.0032 0.001 -0.0048 
 
  Asia_affiliate EU_NA_affiliate 
mean_Asia_affiliate 0.2441 0.1591 






IV estimation: First stage results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 






















































































































































































(49.66) (35.07)   (44.46) (30.88) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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t statistics are in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. 
 
TABLE 3-B 
IV estimation: Second stage results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable JC JC JD JD Net Net 
Asia_affiliate 185.5** 144.1** -9.466 -14.01 197.1*** 154.1** 
 (73.31) (72.90) (74.02) (74.03) (73.67) (74.04) 
EU_NA_affiliate -339.2*** -301.6** -241.5* -239.3* -71.84 -32.92 
 (130.0) (128.2) (131.3) (130.2) (117.7) (116.4) 
Capital_labor_ratio -49.02*** -43.71*** 14.52*** 18.66*** -71.70*** -70.59*** 
 (3.305) (3.776) (3.337) (3.834) (3.302) (3.777) 
R&D share -1.332 16.93 30.04 28.73 -35.23 -9.651 
 (20.34) (20.37) (20.54) (20.69) (22.66) (22.77) 
Foreign_capital_share -0.0964*** -0.0998*** -0.123*** -0.125*** -0.0403 -0.0366 
 (0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0235) (0.0237) (0.0280) (0.0279) 
Firm_age -0.00544 -0.00511 0.000261 9.79e-05 -0.00832 -0.00701 
 (0.0155) (0.0154) (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0227) (0.0226) 
TFP_LP -1.948  42.37***  -53.81***  
 (7.816)  (7.891)  (8.075)  
ln_Revenue  35.48***  39.12***  -7.736 
  (8.079)  (8.204)  (8.465) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 147,152 147,152 147,152 147,152 124,758 124,758 
Number of firms 18,793 18,793 18,793 18,793 16,574 16,574 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic 
76.68 78.00 76.68 78.00 73.57 74.38 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 
10%. 
Notes: We use mean_Asia_affiliate and mean_EU_NA_affiliate as IVs. 
 
 
Robustness checks and further issues 
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For robustness checks, we use alternative instruments―exchange rate and lagged values of 
Asia_affiliate and EU_NA_affiliate (Alfaro et al., 2004; Keller and Yeaple, 2009). From 
theoretical and empirical standpoints, exchange rates are known as one of the significant 
determinants of FDI (Froot and Stein, 1991; Blonigen, 1997).13 Among others, Froot and Stein 
(1991) emphasize that real exchange rates affect the attitudes of foreign investors by changing 
their relative wealth. A depreciation in the real exchange rate of the host country makes assets 
relatively cheap. Thus, foreign multinationals invest more in the host country under imperfect 
capital markets, where external financing is more costly than internal financing. The validity of 
our instruments rests on such theories. Similar identification strategies can be found in Alfaro 
et al. (2004), who examine the effect of FDI on economic growth, and in Keller and Yeaple 
(2009), who examine the effect of FDI on firm productivity. We will follow these practices and 
use real effective exchange rates of the Japanese Yen against Asian and European/North 
American regions as verification instruments.14 The results are presented in Table 4. Generally, 
the impact of Asia_affiliate and EU_NA_affiliate on JC and JD has the same signs as in the 
previous results and is statistically significant. Both have a positive influence on net 
employment, which is also consistent with previous findings.  
 
TABLE 4-A 
First stage results using alternative IVs (exchange rates and lagged FDI measurements) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 











































13 See also Görg and Wakelin (2002); and Qi et al. (2019) for subsequent developments. 
14 See Appendix 2 for how we construct the real effective exchange rates by region. 
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(20.68) (11.93)   (20.68) (11.93) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 



















t statistics are in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. 
 
TABLE 4-B 
Second stage results using alternative IVs (exchange rates and lagged FDI measurements) 
20 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable JC JC JD JD Net Net 
Asia_affiliate 16.44*** 11.98** -13.25** -13.40** 26.58*** 22.09*** 
 (5.903) (5.919) (6.080) (6.098) (5.171) (5.187) 
EU_NA_affiliate -33.64*** -36.28*** -43.24*** -43.56*** 6.981 4.542 
 (7.609) (7.616) (7.838) (7.845) (6.666) (6.674) 
Capital_labor_ratio -63.69*** -59.32*** 5.587 7.449** -69.94*** -67.17*** 
 (3.469) (3.532) (3.573) (3.639) (3.039) (3.096) 
R&D share -17.82 4.052 5.886 2.965 -18.40 7.094 
 (24.68) (24.64) (25.43) (25.38) (21.62) (21.59) 
Foreign_capital_share -0.0507 -0.0490 -0.0128 -0.0138 -0.0473* -0.0446 
 (0.0311) (0.0311) (0.0320) (0.0320) (0.0272) (0.0272) 
Firm_age 0.0313 0.0317 0.0357 0.0358 -0.00146 -0.00104 
 (0.0266) (0.0266) (0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0233) (0.0233) 
TFP_LP -11.59**  24.49***  -35.38***  
 (5.490)  (5.655)  (4.809)  
ln_Revenue  27.94***  19.33***  10.58** 
  (4.868)  (5.015)  (4.266) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 118,859 118,859 118,859 118,859 118,859 118,859 
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.008 
Number of firms 15,535 15,535 15,535 15,535 15,535 15,535 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic 
30630 30633 30630 30633 30630 30633 
Sargan statistic 0.332 0.254 0.198 0.170 1.101 0.856 
Sargan test p-value 0.565 0.615 0.656 0.680 0.294 0.355 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 
10%. 
Notes: We use RER_Asia, RER_EU/NA, Lag_Asia_affiliate and Lag_EU/NA_affiliate as IVs. 
 
In the meantime, changes in the exchange rate may directly affect domestic 
employment dynamics through changes in export prices and the export behavior of firms (Klein 
et al., 2003). To shut down this direct channel from exchange rate to job creation and destruction 
through exports, we rerun Eqs. (1) and (2), while including the export intensity of firms, which 
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is defined as the export value over total revenue. The results are shown in Table A2 of Appendix 
1. To control for the potential impact from past employment status, we also include the first lag 
of employment (in log) in the estimation, the results of which are shown in Table A3. Both of 
the above additional tests provide findings that are consistent with the previous practice.  
One might also argue that FDI firms might have different decision-making regarding 
their investment behavior from firms that are fully home operated. To address this concern, we 
remove the samples that do not have any overseas affiliates and repeat the aforementioned 
practice. The OLS estimation results are presented in Table A4 of Appendix 1, the predictions 
of which remain consistent with the previous results.15 
Another point is the coverage of industries. In the previous estimations, we have been 
using the full sample, which includes both manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries 
(we use two-digit codes, and there are 27 industries in total). However, the impact of FDI on 
employment can be considered different between manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
industries. To confirm whether our previous findings are robust to industry heterogeneity, we 
limit the estimation to firms that are located in manufacturing industries only. The results are 
presented in Table A5 of Appendix 1, where the predictions remain unchanged.  
In summary, the empirical findings suggest that the effect of FDI on job creation and 
destruction may differ depending on where investment goes: an increase in FDI to Asia raises 
job creation and reduces job destruction, while that to Europe/North America reduces both job 
creation and destruction. But through what kind of channels do the causality exist? A further 




15 We also conduct the IV estimation using both the initial (mean_FDI_affiliate) and the new instruments 
(exchange rate & lag_FDI) and come up with robust results.  
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IV.  Theoretical model 
We provide a simple model to explain the empirical findings on the effect of FDI on domestic 
job creation and destruction. The base model is a search-and-matching model with 
heterogeneous jobs developed by Wasmer (1999). Firms have two types of jobs in domestic 
activities: skilled and unskilled. We assume that an exogenous increase in FDI raises labor 
demand in a way that makes the separation (or destruction) of both types of domestic jobs less 
likely.16 The expansion of foreign activities requires the support of headquarters and home 
branches through administration, customization, production for exports, and so forth. How 
much demand for a skilled job increases relative to the other, however, depends on the 
destination of FDI. This differential impact of FDI on demand for heterogeneous jobs is the key 
to our theoretical mechanism. Here, we provide a sketch of the model and relegate derivations 
to the Theory Appendix.  
 
Overview of a search-and-matching model with two types of jobs 
The economy consists of a continuum of risk-neutral, infinitely lived workers of size 𝐿 and a 
continuum of risk-neutral, infinitely lived firms of size one. The representative firm produces 
output 𝑌 from capital stock 𝐾 and employment 𝑁. The production function, 𝑌 = 𝐺(𝐾, 𝑁), 
is specified as a constant-returns-to-scale for both factors.17 The employment 𝑁 consists of 
two types of workers: 𝑁 = 𝑁ℎ + 𝑁𝑙 , where 𝑁𝑗 is the mass of type-𝑗 ∈ {ℎ, 𝑙} workers. The 
firm posts 𝑉𝑗 of vacancies for 𝑗 job type at a cost 𝑐𝑗. The matching process between firms 
and workers is costly in that unemployed workers and vacancies meet each other randomly. The 
existing match of type 𝑗 job breaks with an exogenous Poisson separation (destruction) rate 
 
16 This assumption is in line with the fact that outward FDI by Japanese multinationals is complementary to 
exports of intermediate goods from home, which is likely to raise the demand for workers in home 
(Nishitateno, 2013). 
17 Because all firms are symmetric and the mass of firms is one, variables for individual firms are also 
aggregate ones. Thus, we omit the index of firms.  
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𝑠𝑗. The two types of jobs differ in the following way: the firm finds it costlier to search for high-
skilled workers than low-skilled workers: 𝑐ℎ > 𝑐𝑙 but tends to continue the match with high-
skilled workers longer than that with low-skilled workers: 𝑠ℎ < 𝑠𝑙. The higher hiring cost for 
the high-skilled worker pays off in the longer continuation of match, while the lower hiring cost 
for the low-skilled worker comes at the expense of the shorter continuation.  
The matching process is governed by a constant-returns-to-scale matching function, 𝑚(𝑈, 𝑉) = 𝑈𝜂𝑉1−𝜂, where 𝑈 is the mass of unemployed workers, 𝑉 = 𝑉ℎ + 𝑉𝑙 is the mass 
of vacancies and 𝜂 ∈ (0,1) the matching elasticity. 𝑚(⋅) is the Poisson arrival rate so that 
there are on average 𝑚Δ𝑡  matches during a short time interval Δ𝑡 . We assume that the 
matching is formed sequentially. First, 𝑚(𝑈, 𝑉) matches are formed on average per unit of 
time between ex ante identical unemployed workers and total vacancies. Then, 𝑚(𝑈, 𝑉ℎ) 
matched workers out of 𝑚(𝑈, 𝑉) get employed in the high-skilled job, while the remaining 𝑚(𝑈, 𝑉) − 𝑚(𝑈, 𝑉ℎ)  matched workers in the low-skilled job. The Poisson arrival rate of 
matching for a vacancy 𝑗 ∈ {ℎ, 𝑙} with an unemployed worker, denoted by 𝑞𝑗, is thus: 
 𝑞ℎ ≡ 𝑚(𝑈, 𝑉)𝑉ℎ ⋅ 𝑚(𝑈, 𝑉ℎ)𝑚(𝑈, 𝑉) = (𝜃𝑣ℎ)−𝜂 (3) 𝑞𝑙 ≡ 𝑚(𝑈, 𝑉)𝑉𝑙 ⋅ 𝑚(𝑈, 𝑉) − 𝑚(𝑈, 𝑉ℎ)𝑚(𝑈, 𝑉) = 𝑞 − 𝑣ℎ𝑞ℎ1 − 𝑣ℎ = 𝜃−𝜂(1 − 𝑣ℎ1−𝜂)1 − 𝑣ℎ  (4) 
 
where 𝜃 ≡ 𝑉/𝑈 ; 𝑣𝑗 ≡ 𝑉𝑗/𝑉 ; and 𝑞 ≡ 𝑚(𝑈, 𝑉)/𝑉 = 𝑚(1/𝜃, 1) = 𝜃−𝜂 . Given the vacancy-
unemployment share 𝜃, both arrival rates decrease with the share of high-skilled vacancy 𝑣ℎ. 
Higher 𝑣ℎ makes each high-skilled vacancy more difficult to match with an unemployed 
worker (lower 𝑞ℎ). It also raises the mass of high-skilled match (higher 𝑚(𝑈, 𝑉ℎ)/𝑉 = 𝑣ℎ𝑞ℎ) 
and, thus, crowds out low-skilled matches (lower 𝑞𝑙). The Poisson arrival rate of matching for 
an unemployed worker with a vacancy 𝑗 is defined similarly. 
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Job creation is measured by the number of vacancies that find workers. Aggregate job 
creation and high/low-skilled job creations (per unit of time) are given by:  
 𝐽𝐶 = 𝑞 ⋅ 𝑉 = 𝜃−𝜂𝑉 (5) 𝐽𝐶ℎ = 𝑞ℎ ⋅ 𝑉ℎ = 𝜃−𝜂𝑣ℎ1−𝜂𝑉 (6) 𝐽𝐶𝑙 = 𝑞𝑙 ⋅ 𝑉𝑙 = 𝜃−𝜂(1 − 𝑣ℎ1−𝜂)𝑉, (7) 
 
Similarly, job destruction is measured by the mass of newly separated matches. Aggregate job 
destruction and high/low-skilled job destructions (per unit of time) are given by: 
 𝐽𝐷 = 𝑠ℎ ⋅ 𝑁ℎ + 𝑠𝑙 ⋅ 𝑁𝑙 (8) 𝐽𝐷𝑗 = 𝑠𝑗 ⋅ 𝑁𝑗  (9) 
 
where 𝑛𝑗 ≡ 𝑁𝑗/𝑁 is the employment share of job 𝑗. 
 
Firm’s problem and labor demand 
Each firm maximizes the expected value of discounted lifetime profits by choosing time 
schedules of capital investment 𝐼, capital stock 𝐾, each type of vacancy 𝑉𝑗, and each type of 
employment 𝑁𝑗. 𝐼 and 𝑉𝑗 are the control variables and can change instantaneously, while 𝐾 
and 𝑁𝑗 are the state variables and can change only gradually.18 Solving the maximization 
problem gives the usual marginal productivity condition for each type of job: 
 𝐺𝑁 = 𝑤ℎ + (𝑟 + 𝑠ℎ)𝑐ℎ𝑞ℎ  (LDh) 
 
18 Letting ?̇?𝑗 be the time derivative of employment 𝑗, employment 𝑗 evolves according to ?̇?𝑗 = 𝐽𝐶𝑗 − 𝐽𝐷𝑗, 
where 𝐽𝐶𝑗 is job creation of 𝑗 defined (Eqs. (6) and (7)) and 𝐽𝐷𝑗 is job destruction of 𝑗 (Eq.(9)). 
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𝐺𝑁 = 𝑤𝑙 + (𝑟 + 𝑠𝑙)𝑐𝑙𝑞𝑙  (LDl) 
 
where 𝐺𝑁 ≡ 𝜕𝐺/𝜕𝑁 = 𝜕𝐺/𝜕𝑁𝑗 is the marginal product of labor, 𝑤𝑗 is the wage of labor, 𝑗 𝑟 is the exogenous interest rate, and 𝑞𝑗 is the filling rate of the job 𝑗 defined in Eqs. (3) and 
(4). The marginal product of labor 𝑗, 𝐺𝑗, must be equal to the marginal cost of hiring a worker 𝑗  that consists of the wage, 𝑤𝑗 , and the expected recruitment cost for the worker, (𝑟 + 𝑠𝑗)𝑐𝑗/𝑞𝑗, since the expected duration of a high-skilled-job vacancy finding a worker is 1/𝑞𝑗. Given the share of high-skilled vacancy, 𝑣𝑗 , both equations show a downward sloping 
curve in (𝜃, 𝑤𝑗) space. Higher wages 𝑤𝑗 discourage firms from posting vacancies, leading to 
a less tighter labor market (lower 𝜃). We call the two equations the labor demand curves. 
 
Wage setting and the share of high-skilled vacancy 
When a new match is formed, the firm and the worker engage in a bargain to determine wages 
in a way of generalized Nash bargaining in which the equilibrium wage maximizes a weighted 
product of each party’s return from the job match. The resulting outcome is: 
 
𝑤𝑗 = (1 − 𝛽)𝑧 + 𝛽 [𝐺𝑁 + ∑ (𝜃𝑣𝑗)𝑐𝑗𝑗=ℎ,𝑙 ] (WS) 
 
where 𝛽 ∈ (0,1)  is a parameter capturing the worker’s bargaining power and 𝑧  is an 
unemployment benefit. ∑ 𝜃𝑣𝑗𝑐𝑗𝑗=ℎ,𝑙 = ∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑉𝑗/𝑈𝑗=ℎ,𝑙  represents the average cost of posting 
vacancies for each unemployed worker and increases with the high-skilled-vacancy share 𝑣ℎ 
because 𝑐ℎ > 𝑐𝑙. The worker demands a higher wage when her outside payoff is greater (higher 𝑧) and/or the firm’s opportunity cost of keeping vacancies unfilled is greater (higher 𝐺𝑁 and ∑ 𝜃𝑣𝑗𝑐𝑗𝑗=ℎ,𝑙 ). We also note that the right-hand side of (WS) does not depend on the job type, 
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implying 𝑤ℎ = 𝑤𝑙 = 𝑤, partly because both types of jobs have the same marginal product. The 
equation (WS), which we call the wage setting curve, has an upward-slope in (𝑤, 𝜃) space. 
The steady-state equilibrium is the intersection of the labor supply and demand curves, as 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Labor demand and wage setting curves 
 
From (LDh) and (LDl), we have: 
 𝐺𝑁 − (𝑟 + 𝑠ℎ)𝑐ℎ𝑞ℎ = 𝐺𝑁 − (𝑟 + 𝑠𝑙)𝑐𝑙𝑞𝑙   
or,  𝑣ℎ𝜂 + (?̃? − 1)𝑣ℎ − ?̃? = 0 (10) 
 
where ?̃? ≡ (𝑟 + 𝑠𝑙)𝑐𝑙/[(𝑟 + 𝑠ℎ)𝑐ℎ] measures the hiring cost of low-skilled jobs relative to 
high-skilled jobs: it is greater when the relative hiring cost is high (higher 𝑐𝑙/𝑐ℎ) and/or the 
realistic duration of match is shorter (higher 𝑠𝑙/𝑠ℎ). Eq. (10) is the condition under which the 
firm is indifferent to posting either a high-skilled vacancy or a low-skilled vacancy in a steady 
state. The marginal product of the labor net of the expected flow of hiring cost must be equal 
between the two jobs, determining the high-skilled-vacancy share 𝑣ℎ. If the relative hiring cost 
of a low-skilled worker is sufficiently low such that ?̃? < 1 − 𝜂, Eq. (10) has a solution of 𝑣ℎ ∈
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(0,1). In the following, we assume this inequality for the two types of jobs to coexist in the 
steady state. As ?̃? is higher, the firm shifts emphasis on recruiting high-skilled workers rather 
than low-skilled ones, leading to higher 𝑣ℎ. 
 In steady state, the outflows from and the inflows to the unemployment pool for each 
type of worker must be equal. That is, for each type 𝑗, 𝐽𝐶𝑗 = 𝐽𝐷𝑗  must hold.  
 (𝜃𝑣ℎ)1−𝜂𝑢𝐿 = 𝑠ℎ𝑛ℎ(1 − 𝑢)𝐿  𝜃1−𝜂(1 − 𝑣ℎ1−𝜂)𝑢𝐿 = 𝑠𝑙(1 − 𝑛ℎ)(1 − 𝑢)𝐿  
  
where we note 𝐽𝐶𝑗 = 𝑞𝑗𝑉𝑗 = 𝜃𝑗𝑞𝑗𝑈. These equations are also known as the Beveridge Curves 
(Pissarides, 2000). In summary, the high-skilled-vacancy share 𝑣ℎ is pinned down by the 
indifference condition (8); the vacancy–unemployment ratio 𝜃 and the wage 𝑤 are by labor 
supply (LS) and labor demand (LD); the high-skilled-employment share 𝑛ℎ  and the 
unemployment rate 𝑢 are determined by the Beveridge Curves. 
 
Effect of FDI on domestic job creation and destruction 
We model FDI as an exogenous shock to the firm. We assume that FDI decreases the separation 
rate 𝑠𝑗  because FDI increases the demand for both types of domestic jobs. Domestic 
headquarters and branches need to support expanding foreign activities concerning both high- 
and low-skill intensive activities through administration, product/service customization, 
production for exports, and so forth. 
However, the effect is assumed to vary in the destination of FDI. Japanese firms 
establish affiliates in Asian countries mainly for seeking low-cost factors such as labor and land, 
which is known as vertical FDI. Headquarters and plants in Japan concentrate on the production 
of high value-added parts and components and export the intermediate goods to their plants in 
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Asia for assembly (Fujita and Hamaguchi, 2012). This assumption is motivated by the facts that 
vertical intra-industry trade driven by factor-cost difference is prominent in Asia than in other 
regions (Fukao et al., 2003; Kimura et al., 2007). FDI to Asia promotes exports and domestic 
production, thereby making low-skilled jobs more valuable than high-skilled jobs. The relative 
reduction in the separation rate of low-skilled jobs can be considered sufficiently high, that is, 𝜕𝑠𝑙/𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎 << 𝜕𝑠ℎ/𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎 < 0.19 
Conversely, Japanese multinationals engage in FDI to European and North American 
countries mainly for saving trade costs and seeking new markets, known as horizontal FDI. 
They tend to replace exports by local production to save transportation costs and reduce 
domestic production. In fact, Nishitateno (2013) finds that complementarity between Japanese 
FDI and exports to Europe/North America is weaker than that between Japanese FDI and 
exports to Asia. FDI to Europe and North America does not significantly increase the need for 
unskilled jobs relative to that for skilled jobs.20 This implies that the relative reduction in the 
separation rate of skilled jobs is sufficiently high, that is, 𝜕𝑠ℎ/𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐸𝑈,𝑁𝐴 << 𝜕𝑠𝑙/𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐸𝑈,𝑁𝐴 < 0.21 
Responding to a decline in the separation rate, the high-skilled-vacancy share 𝑣ℎ and 
the vacancy–unemployment ratio 𝜃 change immediately because firms can instantaneously 
adjust vacancies 𝑉𝑗. By contrast, the adjustment of employment 𝑁𝑗 and the unemployment 
rate 𝑢 take time and change gradually. In the following, we will consider the effect of FDI in 
the short run, where vacancies can react while un/employment remains unchanged. 
 
19  The exact condition is given by 𝜕𝑠ℎ𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎 / 𝜕𝑠𝑙𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎 ∈ [0, 𝑆𝑎) , where 𝑆𝑎 ≡ Γ2/Γ1 ; Γ1 ≡ 𝑐ℎ(𝑟 +𝑠ℎ)[𝑥{𝜂?̃? − 𝑣ℎ(1 − 𝜂)(1 − ?̃?)} + 𝛽𝜃𝑐𝑙?̃?(1 − 𝑣ℎ)] ; Γ2 ≡ 𝛽𝜃𝑐𝑙2(𝑟 + 𝑠ℎ)(1 − 𝑣ℎ) ; and 𝑥 ≡ (1 − 𝛽)(𝐺𝑁 −𝑧) − 𝛽𝜃 ∑ 𝑣𝑗𝑐𝑗𝑗 , which we assume to be positive. See Theory Appendix for details. 
20 Hayakawa et al. (2013) find that Japanese firms that started horizontal FDI, defined as FDI to developed 
countries, increased demand for non-production workers in home.  
21 The exact condition is given by 𝜕𝑠ℎ𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐸𝑈,𝑁𝐴 / 𝜕𝑠𝑙𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐸𝑈,𝑁𝐴 ∈ [𝑆𝑑,∞), where 𝑆𝑑 ≡ Θ2/Θ1; Θ1 ≡ 𝑣ℎ𝑐ℎ(𝑟 +𝑠ℎ)[𝛽𝜃(1 − 𝑣ℎ) ?̃?(𝑐ℎ − 𝑐𝑙) + 𝑥] ; and Θ2 ≡ 𝑐𝑙(𝑟 + 𝑠ℎ)(1 − 𝑣ℎ)[𝜂𝑥 + 𝛽𝜃𝑣ℎ(𝑐ℎ − 𝑐𝑙)] . See Theory 




FDI to Asia 
When the separation rate of the low-skilled match declines more sharply than that of the skilled 
match as a result of FDI to Asia, firms find it more profitable to match low-skilled workers 
relative to high-skilled ones. To equalize the profitability of hiring the two types of workers, 
firms increase the share of low-skilled vacancy, 𝑣𝑙 = 1 − 𝑣ℎ, with a lower search cost of 𝑐𝑙(<𝑐ℎ) . This change in the composition of vacancies reduces the average search cost per 
unemployed worker (lower ∑ 𝑐𝑗𝜃𝑣𝑗 = ∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑉𝑗/𝑈𝑗=ℎ,𝑙𝑗=ℎ,𝑙  ) and strengthens the bargaining 
position of firms against workers. Workers are unable to demand higher wages than before, 
making (WS) shift down. Besides, based on the setting where high-skilled vacancies are filled 
first and the low-skilled ones next, the filling rate of low-skilled vacancy 𝑞𝑙 increases owing 
to the fewer high-skilled vacancies. Thus, firms increase low-skilled vacancies more than they 
reduce high-skilled vacancies, making the labor market tighter, as reflected in the rightward 
shift of (LD). Both shifts of (WS) and (LD) result in a higher vacancy–unemployment ratio 𝜃, 
as shown in Figure 2. 
  
 




From Eqs. (5) and (8), the effect of FDI on domestic job creation and destruction is 
given by: 
 𝜕𝐽𝐶𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎 = (1 − 𝜂)𝜃−𝜂𝜃′𝑈 > 0  𝜕𝐽𝐷𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎 = ∑ 𝑠𝑗′𝑗=ℎ,𝑙 𝑁𝑗 < 0  
 
where 𝜃′ ≡ 𝜕𝜃/𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎 > 0 and 𝑠𝑗′ ≡ 𝜕𝑠𝑗/𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎 < 0 . Because of FDI to Asia, both 
types of job matches are likely to continue longer so that fewer existing matches are destroyed. 
The effect of longer duration is greater for low-skilled jobs with lower search costs. The total 
number of vacancies firms post increases, resulting in more job creation. This result is in line 
with our empirical findings.  
 By decomposing the effect into job creation and destruction of each type of job (Eqs. 
(6), (7) and (9)), we can see: 
 𝜕𝐽𝐶ℎ𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎 = 𝑞ℎ′ 𝑉ℎ + 𝑞ℎ𝑉ℎ′ = (1 − 𝜂)(𝜃𝑣ℎ)1−𝜂(𝜃′/𝜃 + 𝑣ℎ′ /𝑣ℎ)𝑈 < 0 (11) 𝜕𝐽𝐶𝑙𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎 = 𝜕𝐽𝐶𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎 − 𝜕𝐽𝐶ℎ𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎 > 0 (12) 𝜕𝐽𝐷𝑗𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎 = 𝑠𝑗′𝑁𝑗 < 0    for  𝑗 ∈ {ℎ, 𝑙} (13) 
 
where 𝑣ℎ′ ≡ 𝜕𝑣ℎ/𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎 < 0; 𝑣ℎ𝜂−1 > 1; and 𝜃′/𝜃 + 𝑣ℎ′ /𝑣ℎ > 0. The proofs are given in 
the Theory Appendix. Although FDI to Asia increases total job creation, it decreases the 
creation of skilled jobs by shifting the share of vacancies from skilled to unskilled jobs. 
 
FDI to Europe/North America 
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Contrary to FDI to Asia, FDI to Europe and North America causes a much greater decline in 
the separation rate of the high-skilled match than that of the low-skilled match. The effect here 
is exactly opposite to the effect of FDI to Asia. Due to the higher profitability of high-skilled 
jobs, firms raise their share of total vacancies (higher 𝑣ℎ). Higher 𝑣ℎ increases the average 
search cost per unemployed worker and, thus, the firms’ opportunity cost of keeping vacancies 
unfilled. Firms must agree on a higher wage demanded by workers, shifting (WS) up. Because 
of the higher 𝑣ℎ reducing the filling rate of high-skilled vacancies, firms reduce both high-
skilled and low-skilled vacancies, making (LD) shift leftward. These shifts translate into a lower 
vacancy–unemployment ratio 𝜃, as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3.   The effect of FDI to Europe/North America 
 
 From Eqs. (5) and (8), the effect of FDI on total job creation and destruction is  
 𝜕𝐽𝐶𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐸𝑈,𝑁𝐴 = (1 − 𝜂)𝜃−𝜂𝜃′𝑈 < 0 𝜕𝐽𝐷𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐸𝑈,𝑁𝐴 = ∑ 𝑠𝑗′𝑗=ℎ,𝑙 𝑁𝑖 < 0 
 




From Eqs. (6), (7), and (9), we derive the effect of FDI on each type of job creation 
and destruction as. 𝜕𝐽𝐶ℎ𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐸𝑈,𝑁𝐴 = 𝑞ℎ′ 𝑉ℎ + 𝑞ℎ𝑉ℎ′ = (1 − 𝜂)(𝜃𝑣ℎ)1−𝜂(𝜃′/𝜃 + 𝑣ℎ′ /𝑣ℎ)𝑈 > 0 (14) 𝜕𝐽𝐶𝑙𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐸𝑈,𝑁𝐴 = 𝜕𝐽𝐶𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐸𝑈,𝑁𝐴 − 𝜕𝐽𝐶ℎ𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐸𝑈,𝑁𝐴 < 0 (15) 𝜕𝐽𝐷𝑗𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐸𝑈,𝑁𝐴 = 𝑠𝑗′𝑁𝑗 < 0    for  𝑗 ∈ {ℎ, 𝑙} (16) 
 
where 𝑣ℎ′ ≡ 𝜕𝑣ℎ/𝜕𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐸𝑈,𝑁𝐴 < 0; 𝑣ℎ𝜂−1 > 1; and 𝜃′/𝜃 + 𝑣ℎ′ /𝑣ℎ > 0. The proofs are given 
in the Theory Appendix. Contrary to FDI to Asia, FDI to Europe/North America induces firms 
to create more skilled jobs and fewer unskilled jobs. 
 
Empirical evidence on the mechanism 
To explain why the effect of FDI on domestic jobs varies in its destination, the theoretical model 
highlights the role of heterogeneous jobs and gives new testable implications. That is, (i) an 
increase in FDI to Asia creates more unskilled jobs and fewer skilled jobs (Eqs. (11) and (12)); 
(ii) an increase in FDI to EU/North America creates more skilled jobs and fewer unskilled jobs 
(Eqs. (14) and (15)); (iii) an increase in FDI to either destination reduces the destruction of both 
types of jobs (Eqs. (13) and (16)): 22 
 We take a step further to empirically investigate the three predictions from (i) to (iii). 
Because detailed information on the skill level of employees is not available, we instead use 
the information on division-level characteristics. We suppose that employees working in some 
 
22 We start from our theory by assuming that FDI has different impacts on the job separation rate, 𝑠𝑖. Ideally, 
we need to check this to verify the mechanism. However, our limited data does not enable us to further 
investigate 𝑠𝑖. We take an indirect approach instead; we derive new theoretical predictions on FDI impact of 




divisions are skilled labor, while those in other divisions are unskilled. The classification closely 
follows that proposed by Autor and Dorn (2013) and is given in Table 5. 
 
TABLE 5 
Classification of low/high skilled jobs 
Division Skill type 
Research & planning High 
Information High 
Research & development High 
International business High 
Human resources, accounting, other management Low 





Warehouse, transportation, delivery Low 
Other domestic Low 
  
 
 We then construct the measures of firm-skill level job creation and destruction and 
repeat the same regressions as in Section 3. The results are summarized in Table 6. The signs 
of the coefficients of interest are consistent with our predictions, although some of them are 
statistically insignificant. From columns (1) and (2), we see that an increase in the number of 
Asian affiliates has a negative effect on skilled job creation and a positive effect on unskilled 
job creation, which is in line with (i). As predicted by (ii), we also see that an increase in the 
number of European/North American affiliates has an exact opposite effect on un/skilled-job 
creation. We confirm the third prediction: the negative effect of FDI into Europe/North America 
on high/low skilled-job distribution from columns (3) and (4). 
 
TABLE 6 
Analysis by high skilled and low skilled divisions (IV method) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




* 12.86** -1.081 -1.257 -12.19** -12.16** 
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* -2.108* -1.903* 7.709** 
9.366**
* 
 (1.181) (1.202) (3.179) (3.237) (1.115) (1.136) (3.381) (3.443) 
R&D share 3.277 4.793 -20.99 -0.640 2.310 3.106 3.494 -0.228 








* -0.0279 -0.0261 0.0101 0.0102 -0.0229 -0.0239 
 























*  0.00725  
24.52**
*  






*  1.450  
17.90**
* 
  (1.657)  (4.461)  (1.565)  (4.746) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 122,578 122,578 122,578 122,578 122,578 122,578 122,578 122,578 
Number of firms 19,254 19,254 19,254 19,254 19,254 19,254 19,254 19,254 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 
10%. 
Notes: We use mean_Asia_affiliate and mean_EU_NA_affiliate as IVs. 
 
 
V.  Conclusion 
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We examined the effect of outward FDI on home employment using unique firm-establishment-
division level panel data in Japan. Contrary to most previous studies focusing only on net 
employment growth, we have decomposed it into job creation and job destruction. This 
decomposition tells us where net employment growth comes from, that is, positive net growth 
resulting from more jobs created, from fewer jobs destructed, or both. Such information is 
essential for ensuring the flexibility of the labor market, which is a key factor for a country 
benefiting from globalization. 
The results show that although both investments in Asia and Europe/North America 
have a positive effect on the net employment growth of a firm, they have opposite effects on 
job creation, positive and negative, respectively. Compared with investment in Europe and 
North America, investment in Asia favors unemployed workers and/or existing employees in 
other firms, contributing to active adjustment in the Japanese labor market. To explain the 
results, we have modeled heterogeneous jobs, high-skilled and low-skilled ones, in a frictional 
search-and-matching framework and argued that FDI to different regions may lead to different 
labor reallocation decisions between the two types of jobs. FDI to Asia raises the demand for 
low-skilled jobs with low hiring costs more than demand for high-skilled jobs with high hiring 
costs, leading to more aggregate job creations. Contrastingly, FDI to Europe/North America 
increases the demand for high-skilled jobs more, reducing aggregate job creations. Such a 
mechanism is also verified empirically. 
The limitation of this study is that the data does not include very small firms who 
employ <50 workers or with < 30,000,000 yen worth of capital. Most firms in this category 
could be immature firms or ventures, whose behaviors and FDI effects could differ from those 
of large and mature firms. Thus, the findings are only limited to medium-sized and large firms 
in Japan. Furthermore, detailed FDI activities and the motivation for foreign investment are 






Appendix 1. Additional tables 
TABLE A1 
Summary statistics 
Variable  Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Job creation (person)  642463 47.48 379.43 0 126237 
Job destruction (person)  642463 44.54 351.13 0 99996 
Net employment (person)  546261 3.64 388.48 -
99691 
126132 
Revenue (million yen)  642463 22869.31 177307.10 1 1.59E+07 
R&D expense/revenue  286415 0.01 0.16 0 57.10 
Firm age  642461 44.53 96.36 0 2005 
Total regular employee 
(person) 
 642463 432.45 1775.64 50 153405 
Foreign capital share 
(100%) 
 642384 2.09 12.23 0 100 
Capital/labor ratio (log)  642463 -0.28 1.22 -7.34 7.96 
TFP_LP (log)  642463 6.71 1.12 -1.74 13.28 
Total number of affiliates  284125 2.92 18.33 0 1346 
Total number of overseas 
affiliates 
 284125 2.32 18.41 0 1327 
Number of Asian affiliates  284125 1.29 7.21 0 524 
Number of European 
affiliates 
 284125 0.38 4.57 0 360 
Number of North American 
affiliates 
 284125 0.42 5.54 0 735 
Exchange rate  642463 97.47 15.97 71.28 130.91 
Export/revenue  642463 0.02 0.10 0 1 
 
TABLE A2 
Baseline results with export control 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable JC JC JD JD Net  Net  
Asia_affiliate 20.53*** 17.31*** -0.373 -0.451 28.28*** 25.10*** 
 (3.649) (3.654) (3.734) (3.740) (3.677) (3.685) 
EU_NA_affiliate -8.509* -10.41** -41.07*** -41.29*** 49.79*** 48.21*** 
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 (4.570) (4.572) (4.676) (4.679) (4.534) (4.538) 
Capital_labor_ratio -50.75*** -46.46*** 9.907*** 11.84*** -69.18*** -67.02*** 
 (2.810) (2.859) (2.876) (2.926) (2.905) (2.957) 
R&D share -8.925 6.795 10.22 7.454 -23.52 1.079 
 (18.72) (18.70) (19.16) (19.14) (20.58) (20.55) 
Foreign_capital_share -0.0900*** -0.0904*** -0.0969*** -0.0979*** -0.0446* -0.0417 
 (0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0257) (0.0257) 
Export_intensity -0.00672 -0.00665 -0.00312 -0.00325 -0.00322 -0.00269 
 (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0223) (0.0223) 
Firm_age 5.134 -2.238 -27.78** -27.25** 31.78** 22.89* 
 (13.26) (13.26) (13.57) (13.57) (13.36) (13.36) 
TFP_LP -2.955  25.76***  -38.72***  
 (4.441)  (4.544)  (4.576)  
ln_Revenue  29.99***  19.79***  5.379 
  (3.914)  (4.006)  (4.046) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 151,727 151,727 151,727 151,727 128,763 128,763 
R-squared 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.009 
Number of firms 23,368 23,368 23,368 23,368 20,579 20,579 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 
10%. 
Notes: “Net” in columns (5) and (6) is defined as the difference between JC and JD. 
 
TABLE A3 
Baseline results with Lag_employment control 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable JC JC JD JD Net  Net  
Asia_affiliate 16.96*** 13.07*** -22.48*** -19.22*** 42.96*** 35.69*** 
 (4.201) (4.201) (4.293) (4.292) (3.606) (3.592) 
EU_NA_affiliate -15.45*** -17.01*** -67.61*** -66.21*** 63.37*** 60.37*** 
 (5.206) (5.203) (5.321) (5.317) (4.469) (4.449) 
Lag_employment -59.07*** -93.06*** 220.8*** 254.6*** -283.7*** -352.6*** 
 (5.697) (6.175) (5.822) (6.310) (4.890) (5.280) 
Capital_labor_ratio -70.90*** -69.18*** 52.65*** 49.68*** -125.3*** -120.5*** 
 (3.517) (3.514) (3.595) (3.591) (3.019) (3.005) 
R&D share -10.20 22.95 -28.40 -53.42** 23.34 82.48*** 
 (23.63) (23.60) (24.15) (24.11) (20.28) (20.18) 
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Foreign_capital_share -0.0217 -0.0167 -0.0294 -0.0330 -0.0134 -0.00468 
 (0.0295) (0.0295) (0.0302) (0.0301) (0.0253) (0.0252) 
Firm_age 0.0247 0.0254 0.0310 0.0304 -0.00368 -0.00221 
 (0.0256) (0.0256) (0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0220) (0.0219) 
TFP_LP 4.551  -35.21***  40.08***  
 (5.468)  (5.588)  (4.693)  
ln_Revenue  63.94***  -80.14***  146.1*** 
  (5.238)  (5.352)  (4.479) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 128,762 128,762 128,762 128,762 128,762 128,762 
R-squared 0.006 0.007 0.018 0.019 0.039 0.048 
Number of firms 20,578 20,578 20,578 20,578 20,578 20,578 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 
10%. 
Notes: “Net” in columns (5) and (6) is defined as the difference between JC and JD. 
 
TABLE A4 
OLS results using samples for FDI-firms only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable JC JC JD JD Net Net 
Asia_affiliate 25.33*** 19.93*** -2.889 -3.374 39.78*** 34.60*** 
 (6.222) (6.239) (6.164) (6.183) (6.134) (6.155) 
EU_NA_affiliate -14.80** -17.51*** -41.33*** -41.72*** 43.08*** 40.83*** 
 (6.245) (6.252) (6.187) (6.196) (6.082) (6.090) 
Capital_labor_ratio -56.53*** -52.06*** 11.39** 13.08*** -78.30*** -75.50*** 
 (4.971) (5.042) (4.926) (4.997) (4.967) (5.041) 
R&D share -15.16 6.051 3.063 2.624 -24.33 0.608 
 (31.71) (31.66) (31.42) (31.37) (32.39) (32.35) 
Foreign_capital_share -0.168*** -0.171*** -0.169*** -0.170*** -0.0923* -0.0943* 
 (0.0382) (0.0382) (0.0379) (0.0379) (0.0490) (0.0490) 
Firm_age 0.000476 0.00150 0.00501 0.00495 0.00299 0.00396 
 (0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0391) (0.0391) 
TFP_LP -11.58  19.43**  -40.42***  
 (8.193)  (8.117)  (8.088)  
ln_Revenue  34.17***  18.35**  12.10* 
  (7.223)  (7.158)  (7.151) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 69,169 69,169 69,169 69,169 61,471 61,471 
Number of firms 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.010 




OLS results using samples in manufacturing industries only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable JC JC JD JD Net Net 
Asia_affiliate 17.75*** 15.34*** -0.823 -1.105 27.44*** 25.16*** 
 (3.516) (3.523) (3.462) (3.469) (3.835) (3.844) 
EU_NA_affiliate -14.42*** -15.76*** -34.12*** -34.36*** 31.41*** 30.29*** 
 (4.435) (4.437) (4.366) (4.369) (4.738) (4.741) 
Capital_labor_ratio -36.41*** -32.83*** 6.399** 7.701** -50.71*** -48.29*** 
 (3.050) (3.103) (3.002) (3.055) (3.396) (3.456) 
R&D share -31.95 -20.72 -5.664 -6.570 -35.81 -19.94 
 (25.55) (25.51) (25.15) (25.12) (30.19) (30.15) 
Foreign_capital_share -0.119*** -0.120*** -0.136*** -0.137*** -0.0474 -0.0471 
 (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0293) (0.0293) 
Firm_age -0.000735 -0.000454 0.00645 0.00644 -0.00443 -0.00388 
 (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0235) (0.0235) 
TFP_LP 1.299  14.70***  -18.94***  
 (4.562)  (4.491)  (5.029)  
ln_Revenue  23.40***  13.57***  7.984* 
  (4.025)  (3.964)  (4.446) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 93,040 93,040 93,040 93,040 80,626 80,626 
R-squared 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
Number of firms 12,279 12,279 12,279 12,279 11,017 11,017 




Appendix 2. Real effective exchange rate 
We construct the regional real exchange rate as follows. The bilateral real exchange rate of 
Japan against country 𝑐 in year 𝑡 is  
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𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑐,𝑡 = 𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑐,𝑡 × 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑐,𝑡𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐽𝑃𝑁,𝑡 × 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐽𝑃𝑁,𝑡  𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑐: US dollar per country 𝑐´s currency,  𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑐: Consumer price index in country 𝑐, 
where 𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑐 and 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑐 are taken from IMF International Financial Statistics. Supposing 𝑐 is 
in Asia, its real exchange rate weighted by FDI stock is  𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑐,𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎 = 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑐,𝑡∑ 𝐹𝑘∈𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎 𝐷𝐼𝑘,𝑡 × 𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑐,𝑡  𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑐: Japanese outward FDI stock to country 𝑐, 
where FDI stock data are from JETRO. The regional real exchange rate is then  𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎 = 100 × ∑ 𝑤𝑘∈𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎 𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑘,𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎∑ 𝑤𝑘∈𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎 𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑘,1996𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎 . 
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1 Setting
We here provide the full analysis of the theoretical part of the paper. Some explanations are over-
lapped with those in the text. The base model is a search-and-matching model with heterogeneous
jobs developed by Wasmer (1999). Firms have two types of jobs in domestic activities: skilled
and unskilled. We assume that an exogenous increase in FDI raises labor demand in a way that
makes the separation (or destruction) of both types of domestic jobs less likely.1 The expansion of
foreign activities requires the support of headquarters and home branches through administration,
customization, production for exports, and so forth. How much demand for a skilled job increases
relative to the other, however, depends on the destination of FDI. This differential impact of FDI
on demand for heterogeneous jobs is the key to our theoretical mechanism.
The economy consists of a continuum of risk-neutral, infinitely lived workers of size L and a
continuum of risk-neutral, infinitely lived firms of size one. The representative firm produces output
Y from capital stock K and employment N . The production function, Y = G(K,N), is specified as
a constant-returns-to-scale for both factors.2 The employment N consists of two types of workers:
N = Nh +Nl, where Nj is the mass of type-j ∈ {h, l} workers. The firm posts Vj of vacancies for j
job type at a cost cj . The matching process between firms and workers is costly in that unemployed
workers and vacancies meet each other randomly. The existing match of type j job breaks with an
exogenous Poisson separation (destruction) rate sj . The two types of jobs differ in the following
way: the firm finds it costlier to search for high-skilled workers than low-skilled workers: ch > cl but
tends to continue the match with high-skilled workers longer than that with low-skilled workers:
sh < sl. The higher hiring cost for the high-skilled worker pays off in the longer continuation of
match, while the lower hiring cost for the low-skilled worker comes at the expense of the shorter
continuation.
The matching process is governed by a constant-returns-to-scale matching function, m(U, V ) =
UηV 1−η, where U is the mass of unemployed workers, V = Vh + Vl is the mass of vacancies and
η ∈ (0, 1) the matching elasticity. m(·) is the Poisson arrival rate so that there are on average
1This assumption is in line with the fact that outward FDI by Japanese multinationals is complementary to exports
of intermediate goods from home, which is likely to raise the demand for workers in home (Nishitateno, 2013).
2Because all firms are symmetric and the mass of firms is one, variables for individual firms are also aggregate
ones. Thus, we omit the index of firms.
m∆t matches during a short time interval ∆t. We assume that the matching is formed sequentially.
First, m(UV ) matches are formed on average per unit of time between ex ante identical unemployed
workers and total vacancies. Then, m(U, Vh) matched workers out of m(U, V ) get employed in the
high-skilled job, while the remaining m (U, V ) − m(U, Vh) matched workers in the low-skilled job.
The Poisson arrival rate of matching for a vacancy j ∈ {h, l} with an unemployed worker, denoted

























where θ ≡ V/U ; vj ≡ Vj/V ; and q ≡ m (U, V ) /V = m(1/θ, 1) = θ
−η. Given the vacancy-unemployment
share θ, both arrival rates decrease with the share of high-skilled vacancy vh. Higher vh makes each
high-skilled vacancy more difficult to match with an unemployed worker (lower qh). It also raises the
mass of high-skilled match (higher m(U, Vh)/V = vhqh) and, thus, crowds out low-skilled matches
(lower ql). The Poisson arrival rate of matching for an unemployed worker with a vacancy j is
defined similarly.
Job creation is measured by the mass of vacancies that match with unemployed workers. Ag-
gregate job creation and high/low-skilled job creations (per unit of time) are given by:
JC = q · V = θ−ηV = θ1−η,
JCh = qh · Vh = θ
−ηv1−ηh V = θ
1−ηv1−ηh U,










Similarly, job destruction is measured by the mass of newly separated matches. Aggregate job





JDj = sj ·Nj ,
where nj ≡ Nj/N is the employment share of job j.
2 Firm’s problem
The representative firm chooses the infinite-time schedule of capital investment I, capital stock K,
the mass of each type of vacancy Vj , and each type of employment Nj , to maximize the discounted
2










{wj(t)Nj(t) + cjVj(t)} − I(t)

 dt,
subject to the law of motion capital and the evolution of employment j ∈ {h, l}:
K̇(t) = I(t)− δK(t),
Ṅj(t) = qj(t)Vj(t)− sjNj(t),
where the dot represents the time derivative: ẋ ≡ dx/dt. The notations are defined as follows:




Nj : total employment,
wj : wage of type-j labor,
cj : vacancy cost for type-j job,
qh = (θvh)
−η : rate of a high-skilled vacancy matching with a unemployed worker,
ql = θ
−η(1− v−ηh )/(1− vh) : rate of an low-skilled vacancy matching with a unemployed worker,
vh = Vh/V = Vh/(Vh + Vl) : share of high-skilled vacancy,
sj : separation rate of type-j match.




(wjNj + cjVj)− I +
∑
j=h,l
λj(qjVj − sjNj) + µ(I − δK),
3
where λj and µ are associated co-state variables. The necessary conditions are
∂H
∂Vj
= −cj + λjqj = 0, (A1)
rλj = λ̇j +
∂H
∂Nj
= λ̇j +GN − wj − λjsj ,
→ λ̇j = (r + sj)λj − (GN − wj), (A2)
∂H
∂I




= µ̇+GK − µδ,
→ µ̇ = (r + δ)µ−GK , (A4)
lim
t→∞
e−rtλj(t)Nj(t) = 0, lim
t→∞
e−rtµ(t)K(t) = 0,
where GK and GN respectively represent the derivative of G(·, ·) with respect to its first and second
argument. In what follows, we will focus on steady states where λ̇h = λ̇l = µ̇ = 0 and suppress the
time index unless otherwise noted. From (A1) and (A2), we have
wj = GN − (r + sj)cj/qj . (A5)
From (A3) and (A4), we have
GK = r + δ, (A6)
which pins down the capital-labor ratio: k ≡ K/N . Letting g(k) ≡ G(K/N, 1), the property of
constant-returns-to-scale implies that GK = g
′(k) and GN = g(k)− kg
′(k). Once k is pinned down
by (A6), GN is also determined.
3 Wage bargaining
Let πj be a marginal value to the firm from hiring one type-j ∈ {h, l} worker. The marginal value,
denoted by Jj , must be equal to the discounted sum of the flow profit and the expected future









On the other hand, the marginal value to the firm from posting a vacancy for type-j worker is zero
because all vacancy opportunities are exhausted by many atomistic firms.
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The value to the type-j worker Wj and the value of an unemployed worker WU are respectively
rWj = wj + sj(WU −Wj), (A8)
rWU = z +
∑
j=h,l
θjqj(Wj −WU ), (A9)
where z is an unemployment benefit. Once matched, the firm and the worker engage in the gener-
alized Nash bargaining, resulting in the following sharing rule:
Wj −WU : Jj − 0 = β : 1− β,




where β ∈ (0, 1) represents the worker’s bargaining power and as noted earlier the value of the
marginal vacancy is zero.
From (A5) and (A7) to (A10), we have
(r + sj)(Wj −WU ) = wj − rWU , ∵ (A8)





= wj − rWU , ∵ (A7)&(A10)
→ β(GN − wj) = (1− β)(wj − rWU ),





























→ wj = βGN + (1− β)z + β
∑
j=h,l
θjcj = w. (A11)
The wage turns out to be common between the two types of workers. This result partly comes from
the fact that both types of job have the same productivity.
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4 Coexistence of the two types of jobs
4.1 Steady-state equilibrium
From (A5), we have
wh = GN − ch(r + sh)(θvh)
η, (A12)




We see that the wage of each type of job, wj , decreases with the share of vacancy for the job, vj ,
implying that these two equations can be thought of as the labor demand curves for each type of
job.3 The wage-setting curves are given by (A11):








Equations through (A12) to (A15) determine the steady-state values of (wh, wl, θ, vh).
We use (A12) and (A14) to obtain
ch(r + sh)(θvh)
η − cl(r + sl)θ
η(1− vh)/(1− v
1−η
h ) = 0,




h )− cl(r + sl)(1− vh) = 0,
→ ch(r + sh)v
η
h + [cl(r + sl)− ch(r + sh)]vh − cl(r + sl) = 0,
→ vηh + (c̃− 1)vh − c̃ = 0, (A16)
where c̃ ≡ cl(r + sl)/ch(r + sh),
which determines vh. We impose restrictions on parameters to ensure that both types of jobs coexist
at the steady states. Let us define a function such that H(ṽh) = ṽ
η
h + (c̃− 1)ṽh − c̃. From the facts
that H(ṽh = 0) = −c̃ < 0 and H(ṽh = 1) = 0, the condition for H(ṽh) = 0 to have a solution for
ṽ ∈ (0, 1) is that an infection point of H(ṽh) must be in [0, 1]. The unique infection point is derived
as
0 = H ′(ṽh) = ηṽ
η−1








v# is in (0, 1) if η + c̃ < 1, in which case G(ṽh) = 0 has a unique solution such that vh ∈ (0, v
#).
3It can be checked that ∂wh/∂vh = −ηch(r + sh)θ
ηvη−1h < 0; ∂wl/∂vl = −∂wl/∂vh = −cl(r + sl)θ
ηvηh(1 − η −
c̃)(1− vh)/(vh − v
η
h)
2, noting that vηh + (c̃− 1)vh − c̃ = 0 and 1− η − c̃ > 0, as we will see shortly.
6
The condition will be assumed in the following analysis.
4.2 Stability
We will check that (a) vh is a stable steady state and that (b) the corner solutions, vh ∈ {0, 1}, are
unstable. From (A1) and (A2), we have the laws of motion for qh and ql:
q̇h/qh = (GN − wh)(θvh)
−η/ch − (r + sh),
q̇l/ql = (GN − wl)θ
−η(1− v1−ηh )/[cl(1− vh)]− (r + sl),
Noting that wages are exogenous to individual firms, q̇j/qj decreases with vj . This ensures the
stability of the steady state at which q̇j/qj = 0 (or equivalently (A16)).
Next, we consider two endpoints. At vh → 0, we have
lim
vh→0
q̇h/qh = ∞ > (GN − wl)θ
−η − (r + sl) = q̇l/ql,
in which case the firm post more vacancies for high-skilled job so that vh ≃ 0 is unstable. Similarly,
we can check that vh ≃ 1 is unstable. We thus conclude that vh satisfying (A16) is the unique stable
steady state.
5 Effect of FDI
We model FDI as a decrease in the separation rate: ∂sj/∂FDI < 0. We consider the effect of FDI
in the short run where only jump variables, i.e., vacancies Vj , wages wj , respond to changes in FDI.
















To see the effect of FDI on job creation, we need to know how FDI affects the share of high-
skilled vacancy, vh, and the vacancy-unemployment ratio, θ. Applying the implicit function theorem
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to (A16), we obtain
v′h =
c̃′(1− vh)






















< 0 if s′h/s
′
l < S
b ≡ (r + sh)/(r + sl)





























l is greater than S
b ≡ (r + sh)/(r + sl).
From (A12) and (A14), we have
ch(r + sh)(θvh)
η + βθ[chvh + cl(1− vh)]− (1− β)(GN − z) = 0.




η + ηch(r + sh)(θvh)
η−1(θv′h + vhθ
′) + βθ′[chvh + cl(1− vh)] + βθv
′









h/(r + sh)][(1− β)(GN − z)− βθg] + βθv
′
h(ch − cl)


























vjcj , x ≡ (1− β)(GN − z)− βθf > 0,
Θ1 ≡ vhch(r + sh)[βθ(1− vh)c̃(ch − cl) + x(1− η − c̃)] > 0,
Θ2 ≡ cl(r + sh)(1− vh)[ηx+ βθvh(ch − cl)] > 0,
and where we used the following relation:
ch(r + sh)(θvh)
η = (1− β)(GN − z)− βθf > 0. ∵ (A12)&(A14)
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Job creation, defined as JC = θq(θ)U = θ1−ηU , is an increasing function of θ given U and thus







With these in hand, we can see the effect of FDI on job creation of the two types of jobs. It can
be checked that JCh = (θvh)






















h)/ [ch(r + sh)

























where Γ1 ≡ ch(r + sh)[x{ηc̃− vh(1− η)(1− c̃)}+ βθclc̃(1− vh)] > 0,
Γ2 ≡ βθc
2
l (r + sh)(1− vh),








2[ηc̃− vh(1− η)(1− c̃)]
Γ1(r + sl)
> 0.









On the other hand, JCl = JC − JCh = θ







∂[(1− η)θ−η{(1− v1−ηh )θ





















































where Ω1 ≡ vhch(r + sh)(r + sl)
[








Ω2 ≡ ch(r + sh)
2
[
























3(ηx+ βθf)[ηc̃− vh(1− η)(1− c̃)]
Θ1Ω1
> 0.
We summarize the results in the following proposition.
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Proposition. Assume that (i) an exogenous increase in FDI decreases the job-separation rate
sj; (ii) the relative cost of high-skilled vacancy is sufficiently high, i.e., η + c̃ < 1 or ch/cl >
(r + sl)/[(1 − η)(r + sh)]; and (iii) the marginal product of labor is sufficiently high, i.e., x > 0 or
GN > z+β
∑
j vjcj/(1−β). Depending on the magnitude of the effect of FDI on sh relative to that
on sl, i.e., s
′


















[0, Sa) + − + − (i)
[Sa, Sb) + + + − (ii)
[Sb, Sc) + + + + (iii)
[Sc, Sd) + + − + (iv)
[Sd,∞) − + − + (v)
We note that the effects of FDI on aggregate job destruction, high-skilled job destruction, and low-
skilled job destruction are always negative.
We suppose that FDI to Asia decreases sl much significantly than sh, corresponding to case (i).
Then it leads to an expansion of total job creation and low-skilled job creation, and an contraction
of high-skilled job creation. On the other hand, we suppose that FDI to Europe or North America
has an exactly opposite effect of job separations rates, corresponding to case (v). It results in an
opposite effect on total job creation, and high/low-skilled job creations.
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